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EGAPs-Arbitration Plans for
Nonunion Employees*
Charles J. Morris**
The program topic labels my address: "Mediation and Arbitration
of Termination-at-Will Lawsuits." Although I shall be faithful to
that topic, at least the arbitration part, I shall do so in a roundabout
way because I want to tell you something about the arbitration of dis-
charges pursuant to a "just cause" standard-a topic with which you
are probably familiar in a different context. Since this conference
concerns alternatives to litigation, I want to examine one alternative
that seems to have been overlooked, but hopefully not for long. I am
going to talk about Employee Grievance and Arbitration Plans
(EGAPs). Therefore, I will touch only indirectly on the use of arbi-
tration in the settlement of lawsuits. But I will cover quite directly a
new approach to arbitration itself. I am going to explore the peren-
nial problem of finding a way to resolve the issue of employee termi-
nations without lawsuits. In other words, I shall try to find an
answer to the basic question of how to bring the due process of arbi-
tration to employee terminations where there is no collective bar-
gaining agreement. But I promise you I won't waste your time with a
discussion of pie-in-the-sky legislation.
Everyone in this room is familiar with arbitration. That's why you
are here. And many of you are actively involved in arbitrating griev-
ances under collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, you have
firsthand knowledge of how well the system works. It works particu-
larly well in discipline and discharge cases-in fact, so well, that the
collective bargaining model of a grievance procedure which includes
arbitration for such cases has become the proud hallmark of the
American industrial relations system. It is the only part of our sys-
* This address was presented at a conference sponsored by the American
Arbitration Ass'n Conference on "Serious Alternatives to Litigation," Los Angeles,
November 13, 1986.
** Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. J.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1948. Member, National Acedemic of Arbitrators.
tern which anyone abroad seems interested in emulating. Indeed,
American grievance arbitration was the model for the Industrial Re-
lations Tribunals which were introduced by statute in the United
Kingdom in 1971. However, the U.K. plan is not tied to collective
bargaining, nor does it provide for compulsory reinstatement of un-
fairly dismissed employees. Yet, the U.K. system seems to work well.
Indeed, in turn it has become a model for some aspects of the legisla-
tive plans which had been debated and introduced, so far unsuccess-
fully, in several state legislatures. You Californians are quite
familiar with such a plan.
But the most convincing tribute to the American model of collec-
tive bargaining arbitration is found here in the United States among
those companies which have sought to imitate it in a nonunion set-
ting. After all, imitation is the highest form of flattery. Still, the
nonunion imitations are flawed. Even those that might be legal are
flawed, for they lack the two most important ingredients which dis-
tinguish the union plans. They lack genuine employee participation,
and they lack genuine neutrality in the arbitration process. It is a
fact that the only benefits that unionized establishments have which
nonunion companies cannot offer their employees is a grievance and
arbitration plan that is both truly neutral and employee
participatory.
Indeed, it is the employee grievance and arbitration plan-which I
refer to as "EGAP"-which is the most unique component of Ameri-
can collective bargaining. Wages, pensions, vacation and holiday
plans, and other fringe benefits, even seniority, can be made available
to employees by nonunion companies. They have done so with great
success, whether such success is measured on a scale of employee sat-
isfaction or on a scale of union avoidance. But they have not been
able to duplicate what has become the most important feature of
union organization at the workplace, the collectively bargained griev-
ance and arbitration plan.
It is too late to turn back the calendar to the days when "master"
and "servant" meant just that. For a while it seemed that the na-
tional commitment to collective bargaining would be sufficient to
ameliorate the harshness of at-will employment. But that didn't hap-
pen. The law, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Federal law now pro-
tects against employment discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
national origin, age, and handicapped status. Further, state common
law has been bursting with the development of new theories, gener-
ally based on contract, tort, or public policy, which establish a variety
of actions for wrongful discharge. As might be expected, this judicial
approach has been spotty and sporadic. It is not my purpose here to
outline these legal theories or to discuss the developing common law
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of wrongful discharge. But, I will note that the courts have not been
able, and should not be able, to provide a complete system of wrong-
ful discharge protection. That is either a proper legislative task or a
task to be achieved by private ordering.
As for the legislative approach, I can only say that I generally ap-
plaud what my academic colleagues, such as Ted St. Antoine of the
University of Michigan, Bill Gould of Stanford, and Clyde Summers
of the University of Pennsylvania, have been doing to arouse interest
in legislative solutions-solutions which are designed to bring the
United States, or at least some of the states-into the mainstream of
employee job protection. Although I applaud such efforts, I have cer-
tain reservations about the legislative approach. Not one of the for-
eign statutory systems with which I am acquainted, and I am
acquainted with most of the systems in the industrial democracies,
can compare with the nonbureaucratic efficiency of employee griev-
ances and arbitration plans, in other words EGAPs, which are oper-
ated jointly by management and unions under American collective
bargaining contracts.
But, you say, that's all well and good for the unionized establish-
ments, but what about the eighty percent or more of the employees
in this country who do not work under union contracts? That's ex-
actly what I want to talk about. I want to explore whether and how
employee grievance and arbitration plans-EGAPs-can be legally
established in nonunion companies. There are a number of nonunion
companies which already claim to have such plans, but these are not
true EGAPs because they are established unilaterally. Before exam-
ining some of those unilateral plans, I want to give you an idea of
where I am going. I am going to explore several methods by which
legal EGAPs can be established. I want to find a way to fill at least
some of the vacuum, a way to provide presently unrepresented em-
ployees with the protection of a fair and impartial grievance and arbi-
tration plan-an EGAP they can call their own.
What's wrong with a "unilateral" grievance and/or arbitration
plan? The short answer is that it is unilateral. More specifically, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to construct and operate such a
plan without violating section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act (Act).' But, aside from the issue of legality, there are other
shortcomings. I am well aware that many such plans exist, though
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(2) (1982).
most do not include arbitration. I am also aware that almost nobody
ever bothers to challenge these plans before the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB). There are several reasons for this. First,
challenges rarely occur unless they are filed by an outside union
seeking to organize the employees: unions which would hesitate to be
accused of removing a plan with which employees are satisfied. Sec-
ond, the employees do not know that the plans are illegal because the
Board makes virtually no effort to advise unrepresented employees
of what their rights are under the National Labor Relations Act. For
example, the Board does not even require the posting of a notice list-
ing basic rights under the statute or even the telephone number and
address of the nearest Regional office. Furthermore, it never issues
substantive rules, only adjudicative orders which must be translated
by lawyers. Nonunion employees simply do not know what rights
they have under the law.
Many of the nonunion grievance plans would be declared illegal if
they were ever tested. This is so not because of any special propen-
sity of the NLRB to enforce section 8(a)(2) 2 but because of specific
language in the statute and an important Supreme Court decision.3
Understanding the law in this area will not only help to pinpoint the
legal deficiencies which are characteristic of many of the present
plans, it will also help to explain just what is required in order to cre-
ate a legal EGAP.
The place to begin is with the language of the Act. Section 2(5)
provides a very broad definition of the term "labor organization." 4 It
defines the term as any "organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees par-
ticipate and which ... deal[s] with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condition
of work."5 In other words, any representational plan in which em-
2. See generally, Morris, The NLRB in the Doghouse-Can an Old Board Learn
New Tricks, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1987).
3. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
4. § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
5. Id. See also Comparison of S. 2926 and S. 1958, 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1319, 1320 (1949) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY] which states:
Last year the term "labor organization" was strictly limited to an organization
which existed for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning hours,
wages, or working conditions. This year the term "labor organization" has
been broadened in the bill to include an organization that deals with employ-
ers concerning grievances as well as wages, rates of pay or hours of employ-
ment. The importance of this is that an employer is now not permitted to
organize a shop committee to present grievances on questions of safety and
other minor matters even though he does not use such shop committees as a
subterfuge for collective bargaining on the essential points of wages and
hours. In other words, the present draft is intended to outlaw certain types of
personal administration commonly used by employers and not hitherto felt to
be obnoxious.
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ployees participate for the limited purpose of dealing with the em-
ployer concerning grievances is a "labor organization." Accordingly,
if such a plan is established by an employer unilaterally, it violates
section 8(a)(2) because it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."6
The legislative history is clear and unambiguous that Congress in-
tended to cover such employee plans and/or committees.7 The
Supreme Court confirmed that construction in the Cabot Carbons
case. Significantly, the original Wagner bill did not include the
phrase "any agency or employee representation committee or plan."9
Those words were added after the Senate Committee had been ad-
vised that such plans were the most common form of company union-
ism.10 It is also significant that the Senate Committee pointedly
rejected Secretary of Labor Perkins' proposal to change the phrase
"dealing with employers" to the phrase "bargaining collectively with
employers,"11 thereby indicating that collective bargaining was not
essential to the definition of a labor organization.
How do the various nonunion grievance plans fare under this broad
definition? Fred Foulkes, in his excellent book on Personnel Policies
in Large Nonunion Companies,12 reveals that a number of well
known companies maintain employee committees, plans, and/or
grievance procedures 13 where the structures certainly appear to be
6. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
7. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2306:
The term "labor organization" is phrased very broadly in order that the inde-
pendence of action guaranteed by section 7 of the bill and protected by section
8 shall extend to all organizations of employees that deal with employers in
regard to "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment or conditions of work." This definition includes employee-representa-
tion committees and plans in order that the employers' activities in connection
therewith shall be equally subject to the application of section 8.
8. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). Mr. Justice
Whitaker, in delivering the opinion of the Court, noted that:
[t]he Court of Appeals was ... in error in holding that company-dominated
Employee Committees, which exist for the purpose, in part at least, "of deal-
ing with employers concerning grievances.., or conditions of work," are not
"labor organizations," within the meaning of § 2(5), simply because they do
not "bargain with" employers in "the usual concept of collective bargaining."
(emphasis in original). Id. at 212-13.
9. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 32, § 3(5).
10. See id. at 1296, 1320, 1322, 1317; 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 2306.
11. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 66-67; 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 2287.
12. F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES (1980).
13. Id. at 283 (discussing successful implementation by large organizations of em-
ployee representation systems).
labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5).
The scope of this presentation does not permit an evaluation of the
handful of NLRB cases which have been decided in recent years
which might provide some minimal guidance on the unfair labor
practice questions. I say minimal guidance because we are dealing
with an area in which Congress chose not to give the Board wide dis-
cretion, as it did under many other provisions of the Act. In this
area, the statutory language alone provides most of the information.
Furthermore, the Cabot Carbon14 decision remains a formidable bar-
rier against erosion of the broad statutory definition of a labor
organization.
I also do not intend to review in detail the different kinds of unilat-
eral plans to be found in nonunion companies. But their general na-
ture will be noted. Very few offer arbitration as a terminal step.
Some provide ombudsman-type representation by a managerial em-
ployee; some provide for employee committees; some plans are de-
tailed and multi-tiered; some are not; and some are so-called "open-
door" policy plans.
Occasionally, nonunion plans will feature a limited form of arbitra-
tion, and to the extent that such plans provide for representation of
the grievant, or for employee participation as representatives, com-
mittees, or in the arbitration selection process, and perhaps even as
witnesses, such plans, in my opinion, qualify as labor organizations.
But, even as to the rare, and possibly legal, plan in which the griev-
ant is represented by no one and where the selection of the arbitrator
is left entirely to an outside agency, such as the American Arbitra-
tion Association, serious problems remain, including an ethical prob-
lem confronting the arbitrator. This is a problem which the National
Academy of Arbitrators may eventually have to resolve, for the
Academy's constitution prohibits members, except for those admitted
prior to invocation of the rule in 1976, from "serving partisan inter-
ests as advocate or consultant for Labor or Management in labor
management relations."15 Since most of these nonunion arbitration
plans are intended, at least in some measure, to be part of a union
avoidance plan, an arbitrator who decides a case under a unilateral
plan may very well be not only an agent of the employer who pays
him, but also an advocate or consultant within the meaning of the
Academy membership prohibition. The fact that the arbitrator exer-
cises absolute independence of judgment does not alter his status as
the employer's agent.
I am sure that there are some nonunion plans which work reason-
14. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
15. CONST. OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS § 6 (added by amend-
ment April 21, 1974).
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ably well. Some, however, may be no more than window dressing
designed to give employees an impression of due process or fairness,
without providing the reality of a truly fair and neutral system. Cer-
tainly none of the unilateral plans have yet discovered a legal way to
provide expert independent judgment to assist the grievant in the se-
lection of the arbitrator, nor have they provided the employee with
truly independent representation in the preparation and presentation
of his case. The subtle effect which the unilateral process has on the
neutrality and professionalism of the arbitrator is particularly troub-
lesome. Notwithstanding the best of intentions, an arbitrator in such
a case has little incentive to bite the hand that feeds him when only
one party is doing the feeding. Of course arbitrators are not dogs,
they are human, but because they are human they ought to avoid sit-
uations, or even the appearance of situations, where they are be-
holden to one party rather than to the other. Voluntary arbitration,
to be true to its historical objectives, must be the result of a bilateral
agreement process.
For these, and many other reasons, unilateral EGAPs are not a via-
ble answer to the need for employee due process in the workplace.
An employer, no matter how enlightened, cannot provide strong and
independent representation for an employee whom it has just fired.
As Senator Wagner stated at the hearings on this provision of the
statute: "I cannot comprehend how people can rise to the defense of
a practice so contrary to American principles as one which permits
the advocates of one party to be paid by the other."16
So where does that leave nonunion employees? Is there no way
that they can obtain the benefits of an effective and unbiased EGAP?
There are several different ways in which a legal EGAP can be
initiated.17
Exactly what is a legal EGAP? First of all, it is not something that
is brand new, although it is something that needs to be repackaged.
The concept is already contained in virtually every collective bargain-
ing agreement. Yet, even for unionized establishments, I would rec-
ommend that the employee grievance and arbitration plan-the
EGAP-in the contract be treated separately, perhaps even put into a
separate document, as is frequently the practice with airline system
16. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1416.
17. I use the acronym "EGAP" because I hope the shorthand expression will be-
come familiar and be used widely, just as the shorthand expression "ESOP" is used
widely for Employee Stock Ownership Plans. EGAPs should be discussed, debated,
and thereby become well-known.
boards of adjustment.' 8 But the EGAP to which I refer is the kind
which can be adopted in establishments where there is presently no
union. It will mean establishing a discreet employee grievance and
arbitration plan without a collective bargaining contract. A full col-
lective bargaining contract would not be essential for an EGAP.
The EGAP concept takes advantage of the broad statutory defini-
tion of a labor organization in section 2(5), which we have ex-
amined.19 Thus, to use the language of the statute, an EGAP is a
"representation . .. plan . . . in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with [an] employer[] con-
cerning grievances."20 Typically, it will provide for various steps in a
grievance procedure which will culminate in an impartial arbitration
complete with a bipartite method for selecting the arbitrator. The
EGAP would, of course, also provide for discipline and discharge for
"just cause" only. In addition, depending on the desires of the par-
ties, it might also incorporate a progressive discipline plan and op-
tionally a list of work rules and schedule of penalties. These terms
relating to the processing of grievances are obviously the usual provi-
sions in the grievance procedure part of a collective bargaining con-
tract. They are, however, unusual in nonunion establishments.
The difference between these plans and existing nonunion griev-
ance plans is that a genuine EGAP can never be a unilateral plan. It
is conceivable, however, that in some instances the terms of the
EGAP might primarily reflect the desires of the employer, but that
will be true only if the employees or their representative agree to
such terms. Perhaps the most visible difference in an EGAP is that
the parties must establish the plan in accordance with NLRB re-
quirements. That means that an employer, particularly if the em-
ployer is the initiator, should never grant recognition to the plan
without first having an NLRB election. This is because the only way
the employer can safely deal with an EGAP without risk of being
guilty of unlawful support under section 8(a)(2) is to have the em-
ployees express their selection of representation by NLRB secret bal-
lot.21 If an outside party, such as an established labor union or an
independent EGAP specialist,22 initiates the plan, then the employer
may be safe in extending recognition on the basis of a card check or
some other reliable proof of majority support by the employees.
18. See e.g., the Railway Labor Act § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982).
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)
(1982) (emphasis added).
21. See generally id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (provisions regarding representation and
elections).
22. See inkfra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's Bernhard-Altmann 23 decision established
that an employer violates section 8(a)(2) if it extends exclusive recog-
nition to a labor organization which does not have the uncoerced sup-
port of a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit24 -and don't forget that an EGAP is a labor organization. This
is why practically every existing unilateral nonunion grievance plan
which meets the definition of a labor organization is illegal, for al-
most none were established by unhindered voluntary action of the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
Once the employers have voted in favor of a named EGAP, and the
name could be anything, the NLRB will issue its certification, and
the employer and the representative of the employees, bilaterally,
will negotiate the terms of the plan. The employees of course would
have to join the organization in sufficient numbers and also pay dues
to cover organizational expenses. How much the dues need be might
depend on how cooperative the relationship is between the organiza-
tion and the employer. Assuming that the employer does not exer-
cise control or unlawful support-in other words, the employees
would have to administer their own organization, independently pro-
vide representation for the grievants, and independently participate
in the selection of arbitrators as a co-equal with the employer-then,
the employer should be able legally to agree to pay for more than
half the cost, and perhaps even the entire cost of arbitration. This
would be a negotiable item and dependent on many factors, both
legal and practical.
Anyone familiar with bargaining requirements under the National
Labor Relations Act might wonder how an employer could confine
an EGAP organization to the limited subject matter of grievances
and arbitration. An employer cannot insist on such a limitation, but
it can bargain for it. And if the EGAP representative of the employ-
ees agrees to grant to the employer unilateral control of all other
mandatory subjects of bargaining, including wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment except for the employee griev-
ance and arbitration plan, then so be it. That would not be unlawful.
23. See infra, note 24, at 732 n.1 (Bernhard-Altmann is the name of the company
involved, not the case).
24. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 366 U.S.
731 (1961).
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated, "Bernard-Altmann granted exclusive
bargaining status to an agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby im-
pressing that agent upon the nonconsenting majority. There could be no clearer
abridgment of § 7 of the Act .... Id. at 737.
The Supreme Court made that clear many years ago in the American
National Insurance25 case.
Of course, an employer will have no guarantee that its employees
will not eventually want their EGAP to act more like a traditional
union-no guarantee other than a carefully drafted management
rights clause, an adequate zipper clause, and a contract bar doctrine
which would insulate the plan for a three year period. Nevertheless,
if this otherwise nonunion employer can manage to keep its employ-
ees satisfied without a traditional collective bargaining contract, and
if it can lawfully and convincingly communicate management's
desires by exercising its free speech rights under section 8(c), 26 then
the lamb-like EGAP is not likely to turn into a lion-like labor union.
On the other hand, the employer might discover that employee
participation which began merely as a grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure could ripen into a healthy cooperative relationship in which
the employees could assume more of an active role in decision-mak-
ing that affects them in the work place. Should the docile EGAP
turn into an active labor union, the employees would simply be exer-
cising their rights under the law. Hopefully, the employer and the
newly active union would adjust to each other as sensible collective
bargaining partners, recognizing that labor relations today and in the
future ought to be more cooperative and less adversarial than it has
traditionally been in this country.
I have described an EGAP initiated by the employer. I anticipate,
however, that the impetus for the creation of an EGAP could come
from any of four different sources. Thus, the prospect of some
healthy competition might serve to stimulate their creation.
It is true that nonunion employers are a possible source of EGAP
initiation. I do not, however, expect that employers with unilateral
plans will rush to abandon those plans and replace them with legal
EGAPs. Most employers would be happy to have their cake and eat
it too. They would naturally prefer a plan that is employer con-
trolled, and it is likely that they will continue to maintain such plans
unless and until the National Labor Relations Board bars them from
doing so. Accordingly, I recognize that employer support of the legal
EGAPs which I have described will not soon be forthcoming, cer-
tainly not until and unless the restraints of section 8(a)(2)27 are ade-
quately enforced by the National Labor Relations Board.
But employers are not the only parties who might initiate EGAPs.
25. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
26. § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Subsection (c) provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he ex-
pressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof ... shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Id.
27. See supra notes 4 and 6.
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A second source would be nonunion employees themselves. Upon
learning that such a plan is available, they might generate the neces-
sary action which could produce an EGAP. If the idea catches on and
how-to-do-it literature becomes available, some employees might
seize the initiative and organize an EGAP28 or they might do this by
utilizing the services of an EGAP specialist or consultant,29 which
would be the third source from which the impetus might come.
That third source, an EGAP specialist or consultant, will probably
be an attorney, although he or she could be anyone with sufficient
expertise and other suitable qualities who has access to good legal
assistance. These persons could prove to be the most aggressive and
ultimately the most successful movers and shakers in the establish-
ment of EGAPs and in spreading the EGAP idea. They would cer-
tainly have something worthwhile to sell-either to employers or to
employees, and sometimes even to both. There are pitfalls, however,
and a legally unskilled person in this field could do more harm than
good. Employees might be intimidated or fired, and employers could
find themselves guilty of unfair labor practices as a result of poor ad-
vice or lack of legal knowledge on the part of non-lawyer consultants.
But if the specialist or consultant is truly professional, well meaning,
knowledgeable, and careful, then the role could be a very positive
one in the establishment of legal EGAPs.
The fourth source of EGAP impetus will be traditional labor un-
ions. Unions might see in an EGAP the opportunity to represent em-
ployees on a limited basis: employees they might otherwise not be
able to organize. By confining its organizational campaign to the es-
tablishment of an EGAP, however, the union would effectively limit
the scope of the employer's objections and defuse much of the usual
antiunion rhetoric. Of course, representation which begins only with
an EGAP might in time expand to full collective bargaining repre-
sentation. But that would depend on many different factors not per-
tinent to this presentation.
Remember, EGAP stands for "Employee Grievance and Arbitra-
tion Plan." I hope EGAPs have aroused your interest. If not, then
perhaps your curiosity.
28. Although this might be with the employer's approval, it hopefully would not
be with his unlawful support.
29. Usually an attorney or consultant with sufficient expertise in the area.

